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Market Power and Windfall Profits in Emission Permit Markets 
 
Abstract 
Market power in permit markets has been examined in some detail following the 
seminal work of Hahn (1984), but the effect of free allocation on price manipulation 
with market power in both output and permit market has not specifically been 
addressed.  I show that in this case, the threshold of free allocation above which a 
dominant firm  will  increase  the permit price is  below  its  optimal  emissions  in a 
competitive market and that by means of permit allocation alone, overall efficiency 
cannot be achieved.  In addition to being of general economic interest, this issue is 
relevant in the context of the EUETS.  I find that the largest German, UK and 
Nordpool power generators received free allowances in excess of the derived 
threshold.  Conditional on having  price-setting  power  in both the electricity and 
permit markets, these firms would have found it profitable to manipulate the permit 
price upwards.   
 
Keywords: Market power, emissions permit markets, air pollution, EU ETS, CO2, 
electricity generation, permit allocation, windfall profits, cost pass-through.   
JEL codes: D42-43, L11-13, L94, Q52-54.     2 
1.  Introduction 
During the first 18 months of the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme 
(EU ETS), the allowance price per ton of CO2 was far above pre-market expectations.  
The price  fell  dramatically  in April 2006 when  the first round of emissions 
verifications  showed the market to be over-allocated with permits  and eventually 
reached zero by mid 2007, but it is not clear what drove the price so high in the first 
place.  A series of studies (Mansanet-Bataller, Pardo and Valor, 2007; Rickels et al., 
2007; Bunn and Fezzi, 2008; Alberola, Chevallier and Cheze, 2008; Hintermann, 
2009a; b)  have  attempted  to empirically explain the price path by market 
fundamentals such as fuel prices and weather variables, but only with limited success 
as fundamentals appear to only account for a small fraction of the allowance price 
variation, especially so for the period before the April price crash.  As such, the high 
pre-crash price still lacks a satisfactory explanation to date.  An inflated permit price 
in the sense that it is above marginal abatement costs of the market as a whole 
destroys the most powerful argument in favor of instituting pollution permit markets, 
which is to achieve a given emissions target at least cost.   
In this paper I examine whether price manipulation within the EU power & heat 
sector could have driven the permit price above the efficient level.  I set up a model 
where a dominant firm has market power in both the output and the permit market and 
explicitly account for a link between these markets.  By solving the model I derive the 
permit allocation threshold above which the dominant firm will exercise its market 
power to increase the permit price in order to maximize overall profits in both markets.  
This threshold is below the neutral allocation threshold proposed by Hahn (1984) 
under the assumption of market power in the permit market only.  This is the core   3 
result of my paper and means that even a dominant firm that is a net buyer in the 
permit market (which was the case for all large power firms in the EU ETS) could 
find  it profitable to manipulate the permit price upwards, provided it receives  a 
sufficiently large permit allocation.  I further derive a second allocation threshold at 
which the distortion in the output market disappears.  Because this second threshold is 
unambiguously below the first, this implies that efficiency in both markets cannot be 
achieved by means of permit allocation alone.   
The interplay between permit and output market is at the root of what has 
become known as “windfall profits” in the empirical literature.  If firms are able to 
pass through pollution costs to consumers but receive most (or all) permits allocated 
for free, they get reimbursed for costs they never had to incur.  Windfall profits have 
been identified as an issue in permit markets in general (Vollebergh, De Vries and 
Koutstaal, 1997; Bovenberg and Goulder, 2000), and in particular in the EU ETS 
(Grubb and Neuhoff, 2006; Hepburn et al., 2006; Neuhoff, Keats and Sato, 2006; 
Sijm, Neuhoff and Chen, 2006; Smale et al., 2006).  Such profits constitute a wealth 
transfer from consumers to firms but they do not impact efficiency directly
1
While it may be intuitive that my results differ from those derived by focusing 
exclusively on the permit market, they have not been presented in this form in the 
 nor affect 
the permit price in a competitive market.  This no longer holds under the presence of 
market power in both the output and permit market, because a price-setting firm will 
take windfall profits into account when making its production and permit purchase 
decisions.  To counteract this effect, the permit allocation to the dominant firm must 
be below the firm’s optimal permit demand under the assumption of perfect 
competition.   
                                                            
1 Handing out permits for free impacts efficiency through existing distortions such as income taxes.  In 
theory, the revenue from a tax or selling permits has to be recycled through lower distortionary taxes to 
achieve (Bovenberg and Goulder, 1996; Parry, 1995).     4 
economics literature.  The literature that is most closely related to my paper is that 
concerned with what is known as “raising rivals’ cost” strategies, whereby a dominant 
firm influences its position in the output market indirectly via manipulation of input 
prices (e.g.  an emissions permit price).  However, no  direct market power in the 
output market is assumed and the focus is on firms expanding their market share at 
the expense of the fringe rather than consumers (see literature section below for a 
more detailed review).  Furthermore, no new allocation threshold is derived based on 
raising rivals’ costs, and welfare implications are examined at Hahn’s threshold of 
neutral allocation.   
I believe that my results are not just of theoretical interest but that they are 
empirically relevant for two reasons: First, the assumption of direct market power in 
both markets is appropriate:  If a firm has market power in the permit market, it 
almost certainly also has market power in the output market if the latter is a subset of 
the former  (as in the EU ETS).
2
                                                            
2 It is of course possible that large firms perceive no market power at all, or market power in the output 
market only.  What I’m arguing against is the assumption of market power in the permit market but not 
in the output market.   
   Second, the most likely candidates for price 
manipulation in the EU ETS are power generators, and they were underprovided with 
permits relative to their expected emissions.  I show that making them net buyers in 
the market does not necessarily prevent permit price inflation.  Using market data 
from the EU ETS I show that the power and heat sector received a permit allocation 
that exceeded the allocation  threshold  derived  here.  My results imply that  the 
presence of price-setting power in both markets by a firm (or group of firms) in the 
power sector would have resulted in an inflation of both permit and output price.     5 
2.  Literature of market power in permit markets 
One of the best-known results about market power in permit markets is Hahn’s 
(1984) finding that the permit price is an increasing function of the dominant firm’s 
permit allocation.  If this firm is a net buyer of permits, it will exert its power to 
decrease the permit price in order to minimize compliance costs, and vice versa.   
Westskog (1996) extends the analysis to a Cournot model involving multiple 
firms and Van Egteren and Weber (1996) allow for noncompliance, but they arrive 
essentially at the same conclusions.  Liski and Montero (2005)  examine banking 
behavior of a dominant firm and find that the firm exhausts its stock of banked 
permits slower than it would if it had no market power, and it does so by manipulating 
the permit price upwards.  This is the intertemporal equivalent of Hahn’s result.   
Maeda (2003) develops a model where one dominant firm is a net seller, and a 
second dominant firm as well as the aggregate of the fringe are net buyers of permits.  
Again, market power is assumed to exist only in the permit but not the output market.  
Using linear marginal abatement costs and assuming that the two dominant firms 
engage in Nash bargaining, he argues that the permit price will never be below the 
“efficient” price, i.e. the price that would emerge if all firms were price takers.  His 
results are therefore not fully equivalent to Hahn’s, but they are driven by the rather 
specific model setup.  If the only dominant firm is a net buyer, the fringe has an 
aggregate permit surplus and/or marginal abatement costs are nonlinear, the resulting 
price could fall below the efficient price.   
The issue of market power in both permit and output markets is closely related 
to the literature pertaining to “raising rivals’ costs” (Salop and Scheffman, 1983; 
Krattenmaker and Salop, 1986b; a; Salop and Scheffman, 1987; Hart and Tirole, 
1990; Ordover, Saloner and Salop, 1990), henceforth referred to as RRC.  The focus   6 
of this literature is the theory that predatory firms may increase their market share and 
overall profits by artificially increasing industry costs, under the assumptions that 
these costs are lower for the dominant firm than for the fringe.  These increased costs 
can take many forms, including the institution of mandatory standards, labeling, 
advertising etc, all of which are expected to be less costly on a per-output basis for the 
dominant firm than for the price-taking fringe.  One particular version of RRC is to 
over-purchase necessary inputs of production (Salop and Scheffman, 1987), which is 
a profitable strategy if the output price increase from this manipulation exceeds the 
firm’s average cost increase.   
A number studies have applied the theory of RRC to the context of a permit 
market, which can be understood as a necessary input for production.  The first of 
these is by Misiolek and Elder (1989), who set up a model where a dominant firm has 
market power in the permit market, which enables it to increase rivals’ costs in the 
output market via the permit price.  This additional tool, which they call exclusionary 
manipulation, leads the firm to buy more permits than what it would buy if it were to 
focus on compliance cost minimization alone (i.e. Hahn’s case).  In the monopoly 
case  (net  permit  seller), the increased permit demand unambiguously leads to an 
increase in permit price distortion and overall efficiency.  However, in the case of a 
net buyer, this effect may result in a permit demand by the dominant firm that is 
closer to the efficient level than without the link between the two markets, and thus in 
an increased overall efficiency.  If the exclusionary effect is very strong,
3
                                                            
3 The strength of the exclusionary manipulation effect is a function of the dominant firm’s degree of 
market power in the permit market, the sensitivity of the fringe’s product output to changes in the 
permit price, and the own-price elasticity of consumer demand and fringe supply.   
 it can even 
lead the net buyer to push the permit price beyond its efficient level, which is 
qualitatively similar to my findings.     7 
Von der Fehr (1993) extends the analysis to the case of two dominant firms that 
engage in Cournot behavior and focuses on exclusionary manipulation, whereas 
Sartzetakis  (1997a)  addresses positioning (predatory)  behavior  based on  RRC  in 
emissions permit markets.  He finds that the more stringent the environmental 
regulation, the more profitable RRC  will be, and that welfare implications are 
ambiguous and depend on the efficiency of the dominant firm relative to the fringe.  
In a different paper, the same author examines welfare implications under limited 
information and concludes that in spite of price manipulation, overall  welfare is 
greater in a permit market than under command and control (Sartzetakis, 1997b).   
Although this literature is very closely related to my paper and agrees with my 
key finding that dominant net permit buyers may find it optimal to inflate the permit 
price, there are important differences:  First, RRC abstains from computing an initial 
permit allocation threshold where the exclusionary effect exactly cancels out the cost-
minimizing effect for a net buyer.  In any case, such a threshold would be different to 
the one derived here and it would result in full efficiency.  This is because in the RRC 
setting, the dominant firm only perceives direct market power in the permit market 
and is able to influence the price in the output market only indirectly via the permit 
price.  In contrast, the presence of two distortions in my model makes it impossible to 
obtain full efficiency by means of one policy instrument alone.   
Second, the focus of RRC is exclusionary manipulation where the dominant 
firm increases its profits at the expense of the fringe.  In my model, profits from 
jointly manipulating output and permit prices accrue to all firms in the industry and 
they come at the expense of consumers and taxpayers.  In fact, fringe firms can free-
ride on the manipulative actions of the dominant firm because they can pass on the 
increased compliance costs to consumers and enjoy windfall profits without incurring   8 
the costs of price manipulation.  And third, whether or not RRC is profitable for a 
firm depends on its costs relative to that of the fringe.  As I show below, in my model 
even extremely pollution-intensive firms can find it profitable to push up the permit 
price, provided that it receives a sufficiently generous amount of initial allocation.   
As a complement to this theoretical literature, a number of experimental studies 
assess the empirical  importance of different features of  permit markets, including 
market power  (Muller and Mestelman, 1998).  Godby  (2002)  tests Hahn’s and 
Misiolek’s theory in accordingly designed laboratory experiments and finds that it 
predicts actual outcomes better than theory that is based on completely competitive 
markets, and that the effect of market power may be significant.  Brown-Kruse et al. 
(1995) carry out similar experiments and likewise find that market power matters, 
especially when the dominant firm engages in more than simply cost-minimizing 
manipulation but takes the output market into account.  Although the experimental 
setups are not directly applicable to my model because they follow the assumption of 
RRC in that the dominant firm only perceives direct market power in the permit 
market, they nevertheless indicate that market power can be important, especially 
when it is not limited to cost-minimizing behavior in the permit market.   
3.  Model 
In the following I set up a simple model for an industry sector containing N 
firms that is subject to an emissions permit market.
4
iN ∈
  I define the cost function for 
firm   as 
 
C
i(qi,ei ) , a continuous function which depends on output 
 
qi  and 
emissions 
 
ei  and is twice differentiable in both arguments.  Costs are increasing in 
                                                            
4 This permit market may also include other sectors, but for simplicity I will confine the analysis to one 
sector.  Note that the more sectors are covered by the permit market, the less tenable is the assumption 
of market power in the permit but not the output market.     9 
output, decreasing in emissions and convex in both arguments, such that 
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> 0.  I assume that firm 1 has 
market power in both the output and the permit market.   
To study the equilibrium, I start by analyzing the behavior of firms  2,..., iN =  
that comprise the price-taking fringe, before I move on to the dominant firm.  The 
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p is the output price, 
 
σ the permit price, 
 
xi refers to permit purchases and 
 
x  i 
is firm i’s free permit allocation.  With a binding cap, I can substitute the constraint 
into the objective function and arrive at the familiar first-order conditions that 
marginal production costs equal the output price, and marginal abatement costs equal 
the permit price.  This implicitly defines the fringe’s optimal output, emissions and 
















The dominant firm takes (2) into account when maximizing its own profits.  It 
faces an inverse demand function and a permit market-clearing condition of  
(3) 
 
p = P(Q) = P q1 + qi
*
i=2
N ∑ (p,σ)  
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   
 
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x1 are the dominant firm’s output and 
permit purchase decisions, respectively.  This system of equations describes a fixed   10 
point with a mapping of 
 
F p(q1,x1),σ(q1,x1) [ ]→ p(q1,x1),σ(q1,x1) ( ) .  A unique 
solution exists if the vector 
 
(p,σ) belongs to a convex set (which is trivially true for 
prices), and 
 
F[⋅] is upper-semicontinuous and monotone, which is assured by the 
continuity and monotonicity of the demand function 
 
P(Q) and the cost functions 
 
C
i(qi,ei ).   
From equations (1)-(3) it follows that the output price and the permit price are 






The impact of the dominant firm’s output and permit purchase decisions on the 
output and permit price can be assessed using comparative static calculations and is 
summarized in the following Lemma:  
 
The dominant firm’s output and permit purchase decisions will influence output and 
permit price jointly such that 
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1(⋅) = λ 
(4d) 
 
x1 ≥ e1; λ ≥ 0; λ(x1 −e1) = 0 
The last first-order condition implies that the constraint may not be binding.  To 
analyze the incentive of the firm to manipulate the permit price in either direction I 











If with a permit price increase the additional revenue from cost pass-through 
(the last term on the RHS) outweighs the higher permit purchase costs (the second 
term), then the firm’s marginal abatement costs are below the permit price.  This 
means that it will under-abate -or, equivalently, over-purchase permits-relative to the 
situation where it perceives no price-setting power through its permit purchase 
decision in either market
5
 
∂σ /∂x1 =∂p/∂x1 = 0  ( ) and thus push up the permit price.  




1 = 0, then it will not abate at all and 
 
e1 = e1
BAU ≤ x1, where 
 
e1
BAU  refers to 
business-as-usual (BAU) emissions in the absence of a permit market.  Conversely, if 
compliance costs outweigh increased revenue the firm will find it optimal to under-
purchase permits in order to depress the permit price and over-abate accordingly and 
over-abate accordingly.  This can be summarized as 
                                                            
5 Note that it still may perceive market power through its output decision.  Equation (5) strictly applies 




















Condition (6) implies that there is a specific amount of free allocation that will 
cause the dominant firm to set its marginal abatement costs equal to the permit price.  











This quantity is unambiguously smaller than the firm’s actual permit purchases 
or emissions (since 
 
e1 = x1 in a region around 
 
x  1
0, provided that the overall cap is 
binding).   
Note that the firm’s optimal permit purchases and output are a function of its 
allocation, such that the threshold in (7) is difficult to compute ex-ante, except for 
very simple functional forms of the cost function and permit and electricity demand.  
However, the threshold can be evaluated relatively easily ex-post when making some 
simplifying assumptions about consumer demand response (see below).
6
 
  Equations 
(6)-(7) lead to the following result: 
a.  If the dominant firm receives a free permit allocation equal to 
Result 1 
0
1 x , it acts as a 
price taker in the permit market in the sense that it sets its marginal abatement costs 
equal to the permit price.   
                                                            
6 This caveat applies to some extent also to Hahn’s results.  Only if the firm’s cost function is known 
can the regulator compute its efficient emissions and thus determine 
 
x  1
H .  The difference is that in my 
setup, the regulator also needs to know the firm’s degree of market power and find a closed-form or 
numerical solution for 
 
x1
*(x  1).     13 
b.  If the dominant firm’s allocation is greater than 
0
1 x , its marginal abatement costs 
below the permit price and it manipulates  the permit price upwards by over- 
purchasing permits relative to the situation where its permit purchase decision does 
not influence market prices, and vice versa.   
c.  The threshold allocation 
0
1 x  is smaller than the firm’s emissions and necessarily 
makes the firm a net buyer of permits.   
 
Result 1 is the core finding of this paper and states that even if the dominant 
firm is a net buyer of permits it can find it in its interest to manipulate the permit price 
upwards, provided that its allocation is sufficiently high.   
Note that this is a generalization of Hahn’s result, which I will denominate as 
 
x  1
H = x1:  A dominant firm will only abstain from manipulating the price if it receives 
exactly the number of allowances necessary to cover its emissions and therefore does 
not trade.  To see this, simply set 
 
∂p/∂x1 = 0 in (6) or (7), thus eliminating the link 
between output and permit markets.  Also note that if the second term on the RHS on 
(7) is sufficiently large (i.e. if the impact of the firm’s permit purchases on output and 
permit price is sufficiently strong) then  
 
x  1
0 < 0.  In this case, even full auctioning 
would lead the firm to choose a permit price that is greater than its abatement costs.   
 
So far I have focused on the effect of permit allocation on the permit price.  
However, as is clear from (3) and (4), the dominant firm’s allocation also has an 







q1 + (x1 − x  1)
∂σ
∂q1
   14 
With neither market power nor a permit market there would be the standard 
outcome that price equals marginal production cost, i.e. 
 
p = Cq
1.  Market power in the 
output market increases the output price by the second term on the RHS, which is also 
a familiar result.  The last term describes the effect of linking a permit market to the 
output market.  Because 
 
∂σ /∂q1 < 0, this term decreases (increases) the output price if 
the firm is a net buyer (seller) of permits.  Substituting Hahn’s result of 
 
x  1
H = x1 
would cancel this third term, but it would not remove the output price distortion 
introduced by the second term.  To see how my generalized threshold 
 
x  1
0 performs in 
this case, I solve (5) for 
 

















By construction, allocating 
 
x  1
0 to the dominant firm eliminates the last term, as 
in this case the marginal abatement costs are equal to the permit price.  The third term 
on the RHS is negative and thus decreases output price distortion.  However, the price 










                   (proof in appendix) 
It follows immediately that the output price can be brought to is efficient level 
only by allocating less than 
 
x  1
0 to the dominant firm, because in this case the last term 








00 = x1 −
∂p/∂q1
∂σ /∂q1
q1   15 
The fact that 
 
x  1
00 < x  1
0 can easily be verified by using the inequality in (10).  
This leads to the following result:   
 
a.  If the dominant firm receives an allocation of 
Result 2:  
00
1 x , the output price is equal to its 
marginal production costs.  If the firm receives more than 
00
1 x , the output price is 
greater than its marginal production costs, and vice versa.   
b.  The first-best solution in the sense that both the output and the permit price are at 
their competitive levels cannot be achieved by means of permit allocation alone, 
because 
00 0
11 xx < .   
c.  If the firm receives more than 
0
1 x  (less than 
00
1 x ), both output and permit price will 
are distorted upwards (downwards) relative to the marginal costs, along with total 
regulatory costs.  If the firm’s allocation is 
00 0
1 11 x xx <<, the output price will be 
increased whereas the permit price will be decreased relative to competitive levels, 
and the overall effect on regulatory costs is ambiguous.   
 
Results 1 and 2 imply that under the assumption of market power in both 
markets, the amount of free allocation is crucial for price distortion, and  that  a 
“neutral” allocation will result in an inflation of both output and permit prices.   
4.  Application 
In this section I apply my findings to market data from the EU ETS, specifically 
to the German, UK and Nordpool power markets.     16 
4.1  The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) 
In the following I describe the main features of the EU ETS.  For a more 
detailed introduction to the market I refer the interested reader to Kruger & Pizer 
(2004) and the European Environment Agency’s technical report (2006).   
The EU ETS covers CO2 emissions from 6 broadly defined industry groups in 
all countries of the EU.  These sectors are power & heat, metals and coke ovens, oil 
refineries, glass & ceramics, cement & lime, and paper & pulp.  In the first phase, 
about 11,000 individual installations received a total of 2.1 billion EU allowances 
(EUAs) annually, mostly at no cost.  One EUA gives the bearer a one-time right to 
emit one ton of CO2.   
The market is organized into distinct trading phases.  The first phase spanned 
the years 2005-2007 and was considered a pilot run for the second phase, which 
coincides with the Kyoto compliance period of 2008-2012.  Pilot phase allowances 
could not be banked into the second phase and lost their value if unused for 
compliance.  Future phases are planned to last five years each, with no banking 
restrictions from one phase to the next.  On the other hand, borrowing is not allowed 
between any two phases.  But because firms receive annual allowances in March of 
every year but don’t have to surrender allowances until the end of April, they can 
effectively bank and borrow across time within a trading phase.   
Firms can trade allowances freely within the EU.  By April 31 of each year, 
firms have to surrender permits corresponding to their emissions in the previous 
calendar year.  For every ton of CO2 emissions for which firms cannot surrender an 
allowance, they were fined a penalty of €40 in the first phase, whereas the penalty for 
the current (i.e.  second) phase is  €100.  In addition, firms  have to surrender the 
missing allowances in the following year.     17 
Jurisdiction in the EU ETS is divided between the EC and the member states.  
The latter are required to submit detailed national allocation plans (NAPs) to the EC 
for every phase anew (in other words, the cap changes in every phase).  This is a two-
step procedure: First, member states have to decide how much of their overall 
emissions reduction burden (as defined by their individual Kyoto commitments) they 
want to assign to the EU ETS sectors within their countries, with the remainder of the 
burden falling on other sectors such as transportation and households.  In a second 
step, the allowances have to be distributed among the individual installations.  All 
NAPs have to be approved by the EC in order to minimize competitive distortions 
among similar companies in different member states.
7
The scheme is based on Directive 2003/87/EC, which became law on October 
25, 2003.  This left little time for firms and EU member countries to prepare for the 
market.  In setting up the first-phase NAPs, countries were faced with the problem 
that they had very little information about firms’ historic emissions.  Unlike US power 
plants that were subject to emissions regulations since at least the mid 1990’s, most 
firms in the EU had never had to disclose emissions of other than local pollutants.  
The member countries addressed this lack of data by using industry projections 
generated by the firms themselves, introducing clear incentive problems.   
   
Permit allocations, trades and actual emissions are recorded in national 
registries run by each Member State, where all installations that are subject to the EU 
ETS have their individual accounts.  The Central Administrator of the EU runs a 
central registry, called the Community Independent Transaction Log (CITL), which 
connects the 27 national registries and checks the recorded transactions for 
                                                            
7 Although the Trading Directive defines both least-cost achievement of the Kyoto targets and 
harmonization between member states as explicit goals, Boehringer and Lange (2005) show that both 
cannot be achieved simultaneously, given the constraint of free permit allocation.  Thus, there is a 
tradeoff between efficiency and fairness in terms of a “level playing field” between similar firms 
located in different member states.     18 
irregularities.  It is the duty of member states to establish and/or verify firms’ actual 
emissions by multiplying energy inputs with appropriate conversion factors.   
Allocation and emissions by sector are shown in Figure 1.  The power & heat 
sector received nearly 70% of the total allocation.  At the same time, this was the only 




   In terms of installation size, about 90 % of the covered firms are 
relatively small (<1 million ton (Mt) CO2/y) and received about 19% of the total 
allocation.  On the other extreme of the spectrum are the very large emitters (>10 
Mt/y), which make up less than one percent of all installations in number but received 
more than a third of all allowances.  Most of these large emitters are power plants.   



























Pre-market expectations of the allowance price were generally low,
9
                                                            
8 Note that these are aggregate numbers; individually, there were power stations with an allowance 
surplus in 2005 and 2006, and many industrial firms with a shortfall.   
 and the 
steep price increase took many observers by surprise.  Figure 2 shows the EUA price 
during Phase I.  For over a year, the allowance price was above €20, and at its peak it 
reached over €31 in April 2006.  The April price crash was triggered by the first 
9 In a simulation-based analysis of the EU ETS, Reilly and Paltsev (2005) calculated market-clearing 
marginal abatement costs to be € 0.6-0.9 for their base scenario, with prices in even the most extreme 
scenarios below €7.  Medium price estimates by brokers were somewhat higher, around of €5.00 for 
the first phase (PEW Center on Global Climate Change, 2005).     19 




  The second round of emissions verifications in May 2007 again 
found an allowance surplus, but this no longer had a significant impact since prices 
had decreased to a few cents.  Liquidity was overall high, and a significant amount of 
the total allocation was traded even in the first year.   















The fact that aggregate emissions in all three years were below the total 
allocation for those years is either due to over-abatement or over-allocation.  Without 
the possibility of banking, abating more than necessary in the first period and using 
the freed-up allowances for compliance in later periods with a tighter cap is not an 
option.  A preliminary analysis (Ellerman and Buchner, 2008) implies that at least a 
part of the gap between emissions and allocation was due to abatement.  The over-
allocation was most likely not intentional but brought on by the fact that the EU did 
not have reliable information about firms’ actual emissions before the market started 
                                                            
10 Emissions verification numbers were planned to be announced in May, but in late April reports were 
leaked that Belgium, France, the Czech Republic, the Netherlands and Estonia all had allowance 
surpluses, and the allowance shortage in Spain was much smaller than anticipated.  By early May, the 
market was found to be 63.6 Mt long, with 21 countries reporting.  Interestingly, the announcement of 
the Polish surplus of another 26 Mt in September 2006 did not affect prices very much.     20 
and largely defined allocations based on industry projections, with obvious incentive 
problems.   
4.2  Empirical approach to evaluating (7) 
There is evidence that the power & heat  sector was subject to significant 
windfall profits (Grubb and Neuhoff, 2006; Hepburn et al., 2006; Neuhoff, Keats and 
Sato, 2006; Sijm, Neuhoff and Chen, 2006), which sets the stage for price 
manipulation as analyzed in the previous section.  According to market observers (e.g. 
Point Carbon), it was the sustained allowance purchases from power & heat, 
combined with a relatively short allowance supply from the other sectors, that drove 
the price to the –in hindsight-very high level.  There are a number of very large power 
producers for which the assumption of some market power seems plausible.   
The main difficulty to empirically assess (7) is that the effect of a dominant 
firm’s permit purchase decisions on the output and the permit price  is generally 
unknown.  I will work around this problem by making the simplifying assumption that 
the dominant firm’s output does not change in the short run, i.e. during the first 18 
months of the market.  I will justify this assumption below.  Totally differentiating the 
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At 
 
x  1 = x  1
0  the emissions constraint will be binding such that 
 
x1 = e1 .  
Substituting (13) into (7), dividing both sides by  1 e  and  rearranging  yields the 
following condition:  
(14) 
0 1




















where  1 ρ  is the dominant firm’s emission intensity.  Condition (14) can be evaluated 
using market data.  If the left-hand side (LHS) is greater than the right-hand side 
(RHS), it follows that the threshold 
 
x  1
0 was exceeded, and vice versa.  The second line 
in condition (14) is due to the fact that the allocation threshold is necessarily exceeded 
for a net seller of permits.   
Except for very simple functional forms, it is not possible to evaluate (14) ex 
ante, because the firm’s optimal emissions  1 e  cannot be computed.  However, once 




exceeded.   
The assumption of no output change on behalf of the dominant firm is rather 
stringent and needs some justification.  First, I argue that in the short run, consumer 
demand for electricity is very inelastic.  Indeed, the introduction of the EU ETS did 
not seem to impact electricity consumption in the three markets in question.  Table 1 
shows the results from a least-squares regression of monthly electricity consumption 
through June 2006 on a set of monthly dummies, a quadratic time trend, average 
monthly  temperature and a dummy that is equal to zero before, and equal to one after 
the introduction of the EU ETS (January 2005).  The latter is not significant at p<0.05   22 
for any market.  For the Nordic market, the coefficient is significant at p<0.06 but 
positive rather than negative, as could be expected with a demand response due to an 
increased electricity price.  Possible reasons for a very low short-term demand 
response include the fact that the most efficient means to reduce electricity use is to 
make changes in industrial  production equipment or the portfolio of household 
appliances towards increased energy efficiency, both of which takes time.  If a zero 
aggregate demand response is due to  an unchanged production schedule by all 
generators, including the dominant firm, then my assumption is obviously met.   
 
Table1: Impact of EU ETS on aggregate demand for Germany, UK and Norpool 
Dependent variable:  Germany  UK  Nordpool 
Electr. cons. (GWh)  coefficient  t-stat  coefficient  t-stat  coefficient  t-stat 
              EU ETS  0.333  0.60  0.153  0.78  0.664  1.95 
              period  -0.056  -2.29  0.193  6.06  0.099  6.60 
periodsq  0.0003  2.44  -0.0006  -5.85  -0.0003  -4.66 
Jan  2.076  3.92  1.166  4.93  1.237  3.75 
Feb  -1.911  -3.61  -2.600  -11.05  -2.352  -7.02 
Mar  0.748  1.27  -0.386  -1.58  -0.646  -1.99 
Apr  -3.130  -4.15  -3.563  -12.34  -4.422  -11.27 
May  -3.326  -3.33  -3.527  -9.46  -5.028  -9.58 
Jun  -4.065  -3.45  -4.231  -8.51  -6.585  -9.94 
Jul  -2.729  -2.22  -3.047  -5.44  -6.519  -8.64 
Aug  -3.514  -2.88  -3.289  -5.96  -4.875  -6.61 
Sep  -3.451  -3.50  -3.557  -7.63  -5.300  -9.07 
Oct  -0.750  -0.97  -1.543  -4.42  -2.658  -6.16 
Nov  -0.154  -0.27  -0.895  -3.64  -1.607  -4.69 
Temp
a  -0.122  -3.58  -0.148  -6.58  -0.197  -9.30 
cons  55.343  33.59  22.317  8.23  36.401  35.54 
Data range
b  1/1996-12/2007  4/2001-12/2007  1/1996-12/2007 
N  144  81  144 
R2  0.89  0.98  0.98 
a:  Average temperature in Fahrenheit for Munich (Germany), London (UK) and the 
      average of Stockholm, Copenhagen and Helsinki(Nordpool) 
    b: Based on availabiliy of consistently defined historic consumption 
   
   23 
However, it is also possible that the zero aggregate demand response masks an 
increase of the dominant firm’s market share at the expense of the fringe (the main 
pathway of increased profits in the raising rivals’ cost literature), or that an output 
decrease by the dominant firm was (at least partially) offset by an increase in fringe 
output.  From (7) we know that the dominant firm either finds it in its interest to 
increase the permit price if its allocation is greater than 
 
x  1
0 by over-buying permits (in 
the sense that its marginal abatement costs are below the permit price), and vice versa.  
But this means that it is less costly to produce on the margin for the dominant firm 
than for fringe firms, which equate their marginal abatement costs to the permit price.  
It follows directly that under permit price inflation ( 0 dσ > ) we have that  1 0 dq > , 











     for     11 / 0, 0 d dq dq σ >≠           (proof in appendix) 
Therefore,  using the approximation  / dp dσ  instead of  11 ( /) / (/) px x σ ∂∂ ∂ ∂ 




to be exceeded.  Since the purpose of the empirical section is to find out whether it is 
possible that dominant firms in the power sector inflated the permit price, this is 
equivalent to making the test more conservative.   
4.3  Application to German, UK and Nordpool electricity markets 
The effect of the allowance price on the electricity price (
 
dp/dσ) depends on 
the emission intensity of the marginal generator and the cost pass-through rate.  For a 
more detailed description how these concepts are defined and the underlying theory, 
see Sijm et al. (2008).     24 
The emission intensity is largely determined by the fuel used for generation and 
ranges  are zero for hydro, wind and nuclear, about 0.4  tCO2/MWh electricity for 
combined-cycle gas turbines (CCGT), 0.95 tCO2/MWh electricity for pulverized hard 
coal and 1.18 tCO2/MWh for lignite.
11
The cost pass-through rate depends on the market structure  and  the price 
elasticity of consumer demand for electricity.  With full cost pass-through (as can be 
expected with a zero demand elasticity), the carbon cost of the marginal generator is 
fully passed on to consumers.  The effect of the permit price on the electricity price is 
the product of the cost pass-through rate and the emission intensity of the average 
marginal generator.   
  During the day, many different generators can 
be at the margin for some time.  Because of different generation portfolios across 
countries, the marginal generators across countries as well as across time.   
Table 2 presents estimates for 
 
dp/dσ for Germany and the UK computed from 
values given in Sijm et al. (2008), and for the Nordpool market, taken from Fell 
(2008).  The former two are based on Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimates for 
cost pass-through rates multiplied by the emission intensities the authors used in their 
analysis
12
Table 3 lists allocation and emissions of the largest power companies in 
Germany, the UK and Nordpool.  In Germany, the four largest power companies 
combine for 74% of the country’s generation capacity.  Together received a total of 
 and then averaged across years and load regimes, whereas the estimate by 
Fell  is the long-term Impulse-response function (IRF) based on  a cointegration 
analysis.  The numbers mean that if the permit price increases by €1, the electricity 
price increases on average by €0.52-€0.62 per MWh.   
                                                            
11 Note that these are average values.  For each technology, emission factors vary to some extent, 
depending on plant age and technology.   
12 They used 0.973 tCO2/MWh for coal (peak and off-peak in Germany, off-peak in UK) and 0.367 
tCO2/MWh for CCGT (peak in UK); see Sijm et al. (2008) Table 4.2.     25 
725 million allowances allocated for free and emitted 744 Mt CO2 during the first 
phase of the market (2005-2007), which means that on average these firms were 
allocated 97.4 % of their emissions for free.  The firm with the relatively smallest 
allocation (EnBW) received an allocation that covered 90.6 % of its emissions.   
 
Table 2: Estimates for dp/dσ 
   peak
a  off-peak
a  weighted average
b 
        Germany
c  0.57  0.51  0.55 
UK
c  0.29  1.00  0.53 
Nordpool
d        0.62 
a: Peak and off-peak last 12 hours each per day 
b: Average computed as (2*peak+off-peak)/3 for UK and DE 
 
 
Table 3: Allocation and emissions of select power firms (UK, DE and Nordpool) 










   (mio EUA)  (Mt CO2)  (%) 
          Germany 
        RWE  352.72  368.82  95.6  12.60 
Vattenfall  233.04  224.21  103.9  alloc>emiss
b 
E.ON  110.81  119.68  92.6  7.42 
EnBW  27.93  30.84  90.6  5.83 
  Total  724.50  743.55  97.4  21.46 
          UK 
        E.ON (Powergen)  66.14  83.43  79.3  2.56 
RWE (Npower)  47.52  66.41  71.6  1.86 
Scottish Power  37.97  46.52  81.6  2.89 
EdF  36.75  61.04  60.2  1.33 
Scottish and Southern  24.87  25.73  96.6  15.77 
  Total  213.25  283.12  75.3  2.15 
          Nordpool
a 
        Dong  43.46  44.48  97.7  27.03 
Fortum  19.36  20.23  95.7  14.38 
Pojohla Voima  15.87  13.96  113.7  alloc>emiss
b 
Vattenfall  15.02  17.02  88.2  5.27 
Helsingin  8.33  7.57  110.0  alloc>emiss
b 
ENS  7.11  6.49  109.6  alloc>emiss
b 
E.ON  1.05  1.06  99.6  387.98 
  Total  110.20  110.80  99.5  114.21 
a: Denmark, Sweden and Finland (Norway excluded) 
    b: If allocation>emissions, the firm is a net seller and (7) is exceeded trivially 
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In the UK, the market is less concentrated but still dominated by large players.  
The largest six power firms received a total of 213 million allowances, compared to 
283 Mt CO2 of emissions, which translates to an allocation ratio of 75.3 %.  Of these, 
EDF was the firm with the lowest relative allocation with 60.2% of its emissions.  In 
the Nordpool market, the largest companies within Sweden, Denmark and Finland
13
The rightmost column in Table 3 shows the LHS of condition (14).  For all 
firms, this is larger than any reasonable emission intensity, implying that the 
allocation threshold 
 
received a total of 110 million allowances in 2005, compared to emissions of 111 Mt 
with a ratio of 99.5 %.   
 
x  1
0 was exceeded everywhere.  The smallest value for the net 
buyers is 1.33 (for EDF), which is greater than the emission intensity of a lignite 
power plant.  These results strongly imply that all large firms considered here, as well 
as their aggregate, received a permit allocation that exceeded the threshold defined in 
(7) and made operational in (14).  Assuming that any of these firms had market power 
they would have found it profitable to manipulate the permit price upwards because 
their increased profits in the output market more than compensate them for increased 
compliance costs.   
5.  Conclusions 
There is a large literature about market power in permit markets, but to my 
knowledge, no paper has directly addressed the effect of free allocation on price 
manipulation in the presence of explicit market power in both permit market as well 
as the linked output market.  Besides being of general economic interest, this 
particular question is motivated by a very high (in hindsight too high) allowance price 
                                                            
13 Norway is not in the EU and was therefore not covered by the EU ETS during the first phase.  For 
the second phase, Norway linked its domestic permit market to that of the EU.     27 
during the first phase of the EU ETS, which reportedly led to large windfall profits 
especially for firms in the power & heat sector.  These firms received most of their 
allowances for free but were able to pass through a large part of the opportunity costs 
to consumers.  The presence of windfall profits  and the history of imperfect 
competition in the power & heat sector raises the question whether dominant power 
producers could have used their market weight in order to increase the permit price.   
According to Hahn’s (1984) results, the answer to this question is negative, 
because power & heat is the only sector that was under-allocated with permits and 
thus was a net allowance buyer.  In Hahn’s framework, any dominant permit buyer 
would depress rather than inflate the permit price, and would act competitively only 
when given the exact amount of free allocation that covers its emissions.   
In contrast, papers that apply the raising rivals’ costs framework to permit 
markets  (Misiolek and Elder, 1989; von der Fehr, 1993; Sartzetakis, 1997a; 
Sartzetakis, 1997b)  imply that it could well be in dominant buyer’s interest to 
manipulate the permit price upwards if increased profits in the output market exceed 
increased permit purchase costs.  However, this literature assumes only indirect 
market power in the output market, and no efficient allocation threshold is computed.   
In this paper, I derive a threshold of free allocation under the assumption of 
explicit market power in both markets, above which a  dominant firm finds it 
profitable to under-abate and over-purchase allowances in order to push up the permit 
price.  This threshold is a function  of cost pass-through and the dominant firm’s 
average emission intensity and is always less than the firm’s emissions were it to set 
its marginal abatement costs equal to the permit price  (Hahn’s threshold).  If a 
dominant firm receives an allocation exceeding this threshold, both the output and the 
permit price will be inflated.     28 
These findings are not subject to stringent assumptions about relative efficiency 
in production and/or abatement among firms, as is typically the case in the raising 
rivals’ costs literature that discusses market manipulation in input and output markets.  
While the dominant firms may profit at the expense of the fringe by increasing its 
market share, the main source of profit is cost pass-through to consumers via the 
increased output price.  In fact, the industry fringe profits from market manipulation 
on behalf of the dominant firm, as their windfall profits increase as well.   
I apply my theoretical results to the German, UK and Nordpool power markets.  




0 and would therefore have been interested in increasing the allowance price, 
assuming they had the ability to do so.  This result is due high cost pass-through 
coupled with a generous free allocation.   
An important caveat to my paper is that I present no evidence that power firms 
in the EU ETS are in fact able to manipulate either the permit or the output price.  
Given the size of the market, a strict interpretation of market power might conclude 
that even the largest firms are too small to yield price-setting power (Maeda, 2003).  
However, considering that initially the main buyers in the EU ETS were power 
generators, whereas many smaller firms with a permit surplus were not trading until 
later, it is possible that large power firms were able to manipulate the allowance price 
upwards, even if under the assumption of perfectly liquid markets they should not be 
able to do so.  I conclude that it is at least possible that the high allowance price 
during the first 18 months of the EU ETS was due to price manipulation on behalf of 
large power firms.     29 
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Appendix 
A1: Proof of Lemma 1 
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To analyze the effect of the dominant firm’s output on output price p and permit price 
σ, differentiate (3) w.r.t.  1 q  and rearrange:  
(A3) 
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Because P’<0 and  ii ex =  for i=(2,…,N), it follows immediately from (A1) that the 
numerator is positive.  The first term of the denominator is negative from (A2).  In 
order to show that (A4) is negative I have to show that the term in the brackets is 
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Noting the symmetry between i/j and j/i multiplications and dropping the first 
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Subtracting the RHS of the first inequality completes the proof:  
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Now I derive the sign of the other three expressions in Lemma 1 by solving (A3) for 
























because the numerator is positive.  Finally, differentiating equation (3) with respect to 
1 x  gives 
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A2: Proof of equation (9) 
 
Keeping in mind that 
 


























Multiplying both sides by the two denominators (again reversing the inequality) and 

























which I prove above.   
 
 
A2: Proof of equation (15) 
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provided that dσ  and  1 dq  have the same sign.  Multiplying both sides by 
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